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Robust Mechanism Design
Robust Mechanism DesignBergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen Edward, "Robust Mechanism Design" (May 2003). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1421. Abstract:
We study the "ex post equivalence" question: When is interim implementation on all possible type spaces equivalent to requiring ex post implementation on the space of payoff types? We show that ex post equivalence holds when the social choice correspondence is a function and in simple quasi-linear environments. When ex post equivalence holds, we identify how large the type space must be to obtain the equivalence. We also show that ex post equivalence fails in general, including in quasi-linear environments with budget balance. For quasi-linear environments, we provide an exact characterization of when interim implementation is possible in rich type spaces. In this environment, the planner can fully extract players' belief types, so the incentive constraints reduce to conditions distinguishing types with the same beliefs about others' types but different payoff types.
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